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PROPERTY WHICH CANNOT BE REACHED BY THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR A
PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE
MILTON COLVIN
When it becomes necessary for the attainment of its objects
of public purpose, the appropriating power of a government and
its agents reaches quite far into the field of property. It reaches
much farther now than it did in the seventeenth century when
Grotius tried to give it greater favor and respectability with the
people by christening it "Eminens Dominum".
If property cannot be reached when the power of eminent do-
main has been granted and the property is desired for a legally-
recognized public use or purpose, it seems evident that there must
be something about the property itself which repels or eludes the
power and gives the property immunity, or something about the
power which impedes the force of its progress and prevents it
from getting at the property. In affording some instances where
courts have not allowed property to be reached by the power of
eminent domain for public use or purposes, and considering some
of the reasons advanced by the courts in support of their deci-
sions, the subject will be approached from the standpoint of "The
Property" in Part I, and from the standpoint of "The Power"
in Part II.
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PART I. THE PROPERTY
Eminent domain acts directly on property rather than on
the individual. In considering the nature of property, it has been
described as "an aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and
protected by the government", and, "in the ordinaiy sense it is
used to indicate the thing itself rather than the rights attached
to it".'
Hohfeld has very clearly named and described, for the con-
venience of the legal profession, certain legal concepts. His
choice of terminology is very helpful in considering what we mean
by the word property. He recognizes that it is frequently used
to designate the physical thing itself, but he decides that certain
"interests" 2 in the physical thing, receiving legal protection and
recognition, constitute property in law. So far as these interests
run to the benefit of the owner, he denominates them as richts
(or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities. It is in the
sense of the corpus, or thing itself, and these "interests" 3 that
the word property is used in this article.
From the nature of the power of eminent domain as an
"attribute of sovereignty", 4 the conclusion has followed logically
that all property is subject to its appropriation, upon payment of
just compensation, provided only that the requisite of public use
or purpose be satisfied, and many expressions of this conclusion
have found their way into cases and legal literature.3  This power
has little regard for size. It has taken broad acres for irriga-
'Fulton Light, Heat and Power Co. v. State, 65 Misc. 263, 288, 121 N. Y.
Supp. 536, 553 (199o).
*HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923) 28.
These "interests" have been analyzed by Hohfeld as included in "more
or less limited aggregates of abstract legal relations" of jural opposites and cor-
relatives, illustrated by the following scheme of arrangement taken from page 65
of his work on Fundamental Legal Conceptions:
right privilege power immunity
u no-right duty disability liability
Jural Correlatives 5 right privilege power immunity
I duty no-right liability disability
' 2 LEwIs. EMINENT DOmAIN (3rd ed. 1gog) § 262.
' "The right of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and whatever
exists in any form, whether tangible or intangible, may be subjected to the exer-
cise of its power, and may be seized and appropriated to public use when neces-
sity demands it." Metropolitan City Ry. v. Chicago West Div. Ry., 87 Ill. 317
(1877). "All property is held subject to the inherent right in the government to
appropriate it . . ." Alabama and Florida R. R. v. Kenney, 39 Ala. 3o7
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tion purposes,6 and many miles of territory for highway pur-
poses,7 and has used its whole power to take a single painting
from the wall," or to interfere with an easement of cool air.9
Neither sentiment, education nor religion has been allowed to
stand in its way, for it has entered the cemetery,' 0 invaded the
college campus," and taken the property of houses of worship.12
It has also made property, inalienably settled by the state on bene-
ficiaries for charitable purposes, subject to its compulsory power. 13
However, the power of eminent domain has not always been
irresistible, even when the legitimacy of its public purpose has
been recognized. From time to time certain forms of property
have been able to repel the force of its progress.
Property as the Thing Itself
It was recently held by the Supreme Court of Kentucky that
the unburied body of a deceased husband could not be injured nor
taken from the widow by the right of eminent domain held by a
public hospital.' 4 In the course of his opinion Justice Clay stated:
whatever may be the nature and extent of one's
property right in a corpse, it is not the kind of property that
may be condemned and is not therefore protected by section
242 of the Constitution." '"
(1864). Cf. Opinion of the Justices, 261 Mass. 523, 159 N. E. 55 (1927);
People v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 32 Barb. 102 (N. Y. i86o); Bailey v.
Miltenberger, 31 Pa. 37 (1856) ; Alabama Interstate Power Co. v. Mt. Vernon-
Woodberry Cotton Duck Co., 186 Ala. 622, 65 So. 287 (1913) ; Hollister v. State,
9 Idaho 8, 71 Pac. 541 (19o3) ; Eddleman v. Union County Traction, etc., Co.,
217 Ill. 409, 75 N. E. 5IO (i9o5); Kennebec Water District v. Waterville, 96
Me. 234, 52 At!. 774 (19o2); Woodcliff Land Impr. Co. v. New Jersey, etc.,
R. R., 72 N. J. L. 137, 6o AtI. 44 (1905).
0Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56
(i896).
State v. Superior Court, 29 WNasl. 1, 69 Pac. 366 (igo2).
'House Bill No. 1698, Mass. Leg. Assembly (1922).
'South Buffalo Ry. v. Kirkover, 176 N. Y. 3Ol, 68 N. E. 366 (io3); Dona-
hue v. Keystone Gas Co., 18I N. Y. 313, 73 N. E. iio8 (igo5).
" Wood v. Macon and Brunswick R. R., 68 Ga. 539 (1882).
"Girard College Grounds Case, lO Phila. 145 (1874) ; Cincinnati I. R. R. v.
Murray, io Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 3oi (I9O3).
'Macon, etc., Ry. v. Riggs, 87 Ga. 158, 13 S. E. 312 (1891).
"in re Cuckfield Burial Board, 24 L. J. Ch. 585 (1854).
21 University of Louisville v. Metcalfe, 216 Ky. 339, 287 S. E. 945 (1926)
(1927) I5 Ky. L. J. 359.
1 Ibid. 343, 287 S. E. at 947. Sec. 242, referred to, is an eminent domain
provision.
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If eminent domain cannot reach a corpse, it would seem rea-
sonable that it cannot reach and appropriate a live human being.
This was held to be so, even in the case where the live human
being was a slave and as truly property "as land or any other
property movable or immovable"."6 Congress provided for the
enlistment or drafting of slaves of loyal owners, authorized a
compensation of $300 to the loyal owners for each slave drafted,
and provided that such slaves should be free.' This law was de-
clared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Kentucky on
the double ground that $300 was not "just compensation", and
that the government had no right to appropriate the title to a
slave by eminent domain, but was limited in its power to the
appropriation of the use or services of the slave.' 8
There is judicial opinion that money cannot be taken by the
power of eminent domain,'9 and, according to Justice Field, of
the California Supreme Court and later of the Supreme Court
of the United States, this is due to its nature as property corre-
sponding to the nature of the medium of compensation. On this
point he said:
"Money is not that species of property which the sov-
ereign authority can authorize to be taken in the exercise of
its right of eminent domain. That right can be exercised only
with reference to other property than money, for the property
taken is to be the subject of compensation in money it-
self . . , 20
"See cases referred to in note 18 infra.
17 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, 13 STAT. II (1864).
"Hughes v. Todd, 2 Duval 188 (Ky. 1865) ; Corbin v. Marsh, z Duval 193
(Ky. 1865). Drafting or conscripting, as covering only the use or services
(however perilous) of able-bodied men, has been carried over into the proposals
now in Congress for amendments to the Constitution empowering the national
government to conscript property in time of war. As thus employed, "conscrip-
tion" does not mean, as popularly supposed, the appropriation of the property
itself by taking the title away from the owner, but means appropriating merely
the use or services of what is taken over, on payment of just compensation. See
"Hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs," reported in Government
Bulletin entitled "Universal Mobilization for War Purposes". I have been cor-
rectly quoted, on page 25 of the bulletin, as stating that, since these proposals
involve nothing more than the exercise of the government's present power of
eminent domain, no amendments to the Constitution giving this power are neces-
sary.
" See Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76, 83 (1859).
.' Ibid. Justice Field probably had in mind an attempt to appropriate money
in ordinary times of peace, for it would seem that in time of war or in an emer-
gency which required it for self-preservation, the government could use its emi-
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The resistant quality of money, which successfully repels the
power of eminent domain, has also been put upon the ground that
money is subject to exaction by the power of taxation and this
makes it unnecessary and not permissible to consider it as also
subject to the power of eminent domain. In passing upon this
question, in the course of a decision in a case where it was con-
tended that disguised eminent domain proceedings were being em-
ployed to deprive the plaintiff of money, Ruggles, J., of the Court
of Appeals of New York, said:
"The framers of the constitution could not have in-
tended to delegate to municipal corporations the right of tak-
ing money under this power, because it is entirely unneces-
sary. Money can always be had by taxation; lands can not;
and therefore lands may be taken by the right of eminent
domain, but money may not." 21
If that which cannot be done directly ought not to be allowed
to be accomplished indirectly the conclusion would seem to follow
that since eminent domain power cannot take money it cannot
take property in order to sell it for money. The public purpose
which justifies taxation sustains the power to take property and
sell it for government support, but this high public purpose will
not sustain the exercise of eminent domain power to do the same
thing, even by the State itself. Thus it has been held in Ohio that
in appropriating the water of private streams by eminent domain
power more water could not be taken than was needed for a public
canal with a view of raising revenue by selling or leasing it. In
the decision so holding in the Supreme Court of that State, Mr.
Justice Wood commented on the legitimate exercise of eminent
domain power to take private property and then said:
nent domain power to effect a forced loan. In the case of Hammett v. Philadel-
phia, 65 Pa. 146, 152 (1870), Sharswood, J., in speaking of this question, says:
"I am not able, and do not feel disposed to enter the lists upon such a question,
but it does seem to me that there may be occasions in which money may be taken
by the state in the exercise of its transcendental right of eminent domain. Such
would be the case of a pressing and immediate necessity, as in the event of an
invasion by a public enemy, or some great calamity, as famine or pestilence, con-
tributions could be levied on banks, corporations or individuals." Police power
cannot always be relied upon in time of war or emergency for the impressing of
property into the service of the state. For cases requiring eminent domain and
compensation, see 2 LEwis, EMIxENT DoMeAIN (3d ed. 19o9) § 8.
2 People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 424 (1851).
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"We know of no instances in which it has, or can be
taken, even by the State authority, for the mere purpose of
raising a revenue by resale, or otherwise; and the exercise
of such a power would be utterly destructive of individual
right, and break down all the distinctions between rneum et
tuum, and annihilate them forever, at the pleasure of the
State." 21a
Property as Interests
While it has been said on good authority that "in regard to
choses in action and all other kind of personal property, there
can be no doubt as to the power of appropriation", 22 and this is
the general rule, yet an exception has been made of "rights in ac-
tion, which can only be available when made to produce money". -2 3
Accordingly, it has been held that promissory notes representing
such rights are not subject to the eminent domain power.2 4 In a
case before the Massachusetts Supreme Court, it became necessary
to pass upon the power of the legislature, under a special act au-
thorizing the taking by eminent domain of all the rights and prop-
erty of a library, to reach $1,500 in money and also promissory
notes for the payment of $ii,ooo. It was held that such an
authorization was beyond the power of the legislature and that
neither money nor promissory notes for the payment of money
can be the subject of eminent domain appropriation. In so hold-
ing, the opinion of Justice Field, above referred to, was quoted
with approval and was held to be as applicable to promissory notes
as to money itself.
2 5
There are privileges which can hardly be said to be property,
such as the privileges of members of Congress to refuse submis-
sion to arrest during their attendance at the sessions of their
respective houses, or the constitutionally-protected privilege, which
2 Buckingham v. Smith, io Ohio 288, 297 (840).
=2 LEwis, EMIXENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 19o9) § 413.
2 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIITATIONS (8th ed. 1927) i S.
' Neither the taxation reason nor the money substitution reason entirely fits
a promissory note, for it is often worth much less than the amount of money it
calls for, depending on the financial responsibility of parties liable on it. It
sometimes can be sold for more than the amount of money it calls for when it
bears high enough interest. Query: Corporate shares of stock may be taken by
eminent domain. Offield v. New York. etc., R. R., 203 U. S. 372, 27 Sup. C1 72
(1906). May corporate bonds be taken by eminent domain?
'Cary Library v Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 25 N. E. 92 (180o).
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every American has, of freedom of choice in all matters of re-
ligious worship. There are other privileges, however, ranging
all the way from large corporate franchises to humble patent-right
privileges on small articles of commerce, which are bought and
sold and are recognized in law as property.26 As such they have
frequently been held subject to the power of eminent domain,27
regardless of difficulties in appraising their values.
28
The privilege of fishing in private waters belongs to the class
of privileges which has been held to be property.2 It is more
than an easement and is classed as an interest in land.30 Some
of the counties in New Jersey are dotted with natural lakes, many
of which are on private estates and farms. Members of the pub-
lic were not privileged to fish in these lakes without getting the per-
mission of the owners. The legislature of New Jersey authorized
counties to acquire by eminent domain condemnation the privilege
of fishing on such of these lakes as covered over one hundred
acres. The purpose of the condemnation (which includes access
to the lakes) was to take the exclusive privilege away from the
owner and throw the privilege of fishing open to the general pub-
lic. The putting of this law into effect was resisted, and one
of the grounds of resistance was that it was beyond the legis-
lative power to appropriate the privilege of fishing, by eminent
domain. The case went to the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
where the law was sustained as being for a legitimate public
purpose, and it was held that the privilege of fishing was such a
property interest as could be reached by the power of eminent
domain."1 On appeal to the Court of Errors and Appeals, how-
ever, the case was reversed.32 On the point whether the privilege
of fishing in private waters was property of such a character that
it could be taken by eminent domain, the decision of Dixon, J.,
who delivered the opinion of the court, was as follows:
'Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 13 Sup. Ct 622 (1893);
Brady v. Atlantic Works, 4 Cliff. 4o8 (C. C. Mass. x876).
' See cases cited in note 26 and 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LI1 IITATioNs
(8th ed. 1927) 1113.
' New Haven Water Co. v. Russell, 86 Conn. 361, 85 Ad. 636 (1912).
'Waters v. Lilley, 4 Pick. 145 (Mass. 1826).
Ibid.; 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1902) 275.
n Albright v. Sussex County Lake, etc., Comm., 68 N. 3. L. 523, 53 Att. 612
(19o2).
'Albright v. Sussex County Lake, etc., Comm., 71 N. J. L. 303, 57 At. 398
(19o4).
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"The constitution requires that on taking private prop-
erty for public use just compensation should be made to the
owner, and this implies that the property taken shall be
reasonably capable of just estimation. The lake itself could
no doubt be fairly appraised, as could, probably, the right
of any individual or of any specified number of individuals
to fish therein. But I know of no criterion by which the
right of an unlimited number of persons to spend their time
upon the lake for the purpose of catching fish could be valued.
It might be that the appraisers would evade the difficulty by
awarding to the owner the full value of the lake, but in that
case justice would require that the lake itself and not a mere
incidental right in it, should become public property.
"We think, therefore, that neither in the reason of the
case nor in the settled practice of free governments is there
legal support for the proposed condemnation." 33
A lien is property, 34 and this is true of a so-called mortgage
lien with its power of foreclosure and sale in certain situations
(in a lien theory state) ; as such it can be bought and sold like
any other property.35 Although the condemnor of land under
eminent domain authority may wish to safeguard his recognized
public purpose activity from any embarrassment by condemning
a mortgage lien, with its power of foreclosure and sale, on land
which includes his land, it has been held that this cannot be done,
for the mortgage lien is not subject to eminent domain processes.
In a case before the Court of Appeals of Kansas,36 the facts
showed that a railroad company had condemned a right of way
and secured the legal title in fee simple to a strip of land run-
ning through a larger tract. The entire tract of land was coy-
'Ibid. 307, 57 At. at 4oo. In stating that the commissioners might have
avoided the difficulty "by awarding the owner the full value of the lake", Dixon,
J., appeared to think this to be the alternative when the true value could not be
ascertained by condemnation. However, "just compensation" in the law of emi-
nent domain does not seem to require such exactness of computation. "It may
be more or it may be less than the mere money value of the property actually
taken." 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 19o9) § 684. In the case of New
Haven Water Co. v. Russell, .rupra note 28, it was held that the fact that dam-
ages from a contemplated condemnation of water rights "are such that they can-
not be fully compensated will not prevent the condemnation, all property being
subject to condemnation for public use and the damages awarded being such as
will compensate as nearly as the nature of the property will permit."
"2 Bouvimm (Rawle's 3d Revision 1914) 2750.
'Pool v. Gates, 116 Kan. 195, 225 Pac. lO69 (1924).
"Chicago K. & W. R. R. v. Need, 2 Kan. App. 492, 43 Pac. 997 (1896).
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ered by a mortgage lien. In an action brought to foreclose the
mortgage on the entire tract, the court ordered that the railroad
right of way be sold under the mortgage power of sale, in case
the remaining land was not sufficient to satisfy the judgment.
The railway sought to put its right of way in a position of
immunity from the threatened use of the power of sale, and
from further acts under the mortgage powers, by starting con-
demnation proceedings against the mortgage lien under its
power of eminent domain. In passing upon the legality of the
eminent domain proceedings, the court held that a mortgage
lien (in a lien theory state) is not an interest in the land itself,
and that the law does not recognize it as the subject of appropria-
tion by eminent domain. A portion of the decision seems to put
the situation on an analogous basis with that of money. Says
the court:
"The ultimate object of the proceeding is to enable it
[the railroad] to deposit with the county treasurer the
amount of damages so ascertained, in order that it may re-
ceive the same for its own indemnity. After such super-
fluity of action, it is somewhat difficult to comprehend just
what has been accomplished." 37.
The case also went against the railway company on the ground
that the mortgage lien was extraneous and not a part of that which
could be taken by the railway company for its needs in fulfilling
its recognized public purpose. The court so held, although it
recognized that the railway company might "suffer immeasurable
loss by reason thereof", and it concluded by expressing the opin-
ion that the company could probably get adequate protection in a
'Ibid. 495, 43 Pac. at 998. In the case of Phila. R. & N. E. R. R. v.
Bowman, 23 App. Div. 170, 48 N. Y. Supp. 9Ol (1897), under similar conditions
the mortgage was foreclosed on the entire tract and the defendant bought the
railroad tract and received the referee's deed for it. At this stage of the situa-
tion the railway company was allowed to institute eminent domain proceedings
to acquire title to the portion of its right of way so sold. This case shows what
might have been saved to the railway company in the Kansas case herein referred
to had the Court of Appeals of Kansas decided otherwise, for the New York
Supreme Court conceded that, had the railway been able to move against the
mortgagee by eminent domain, it would only have had to pay damages to his
interest, but held that, having waited and moved against the purchaser at the
mortgage sale, it would have to pay not only for the land but for the improve-
ments it had put on the land itself. Eminent domain, if allowed against the
mortgage lien in this case, would not have been a "superfluity of action".
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court of equity in proper proceedings, but not through the medium
of eminent domain, which it held had no power to reach the mort-
gage lien.
Not only do the ordinary immunities which the law throws
about everyone's person and property have value, but often those
granted by the government are highly prized as property in them-
selves. In seeking protection of such immunities, litigants have
from time to time had to appeal to the constitutional provision
against depriving a person of property without due process of
law. This has been especially true of immunities from taxation 83
and immunities from execution 3 9 Some of these immunities may
be released by consent of the owners, as the immunity of certain
property from attachment, and, where not contrary to public
policy, they may be sold. It has been held in a few states that
it is against public policy to permit an abutting owner to sell im-
munity from assessment and from the effects on his property
which result from improving the streets,4" or to sell immunity
from having to submit to the laying of street car tracks in front
of his premises. 41  However, in Ohio the courts have held other-
wise and consent to the release of such immunities may be bought
and sold. In injunction proceedings in that state an abutting
owner prayed that the construction and operation of a street rail-
way should be enjoined because the legal consent of more than one-
half of the abutting land holders of the lots and lands abutting
the street had not been secured as required by statute.42  The
pleadings and the evidence made it necessary on appeal for the
court to pass upon the question whether the consent of abutting
owners as a condition precedent to the municipal authorities em-
powering the street railway company to lay its tracks in front of
their premises could be sold to the street railway. The court also
had to pass upon the question whether the consent to the release
of this immunity could be condemned by eminent domain. It held
that such consent could be sold and that its purchase was not con-
See Choate v. Trapp, 224 U. S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565 (1912).
SBrearley School v. Ward, 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. iooi (igi). See cases
collected in ANN. CAS. [I912 B.] 259.
' Maguire v. Smock, 42 Ind. I (1873).
' Dfoane v. Chicago City Ry., i6o Ill. 22, 45 N. E. 507 (1896).
4 Hamilton, etc., Tract. Co. v. Parish, 67 Ohio St. 181, 65 N. E. IOIi (I902).
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trary to public policy. The brief syllabus by the court on this
point reads as follows:
"The owners of abutting lots are free to give or with-
hold such consent, upon such terms as to them severally
may seem proper, and there is no public policy in this state
against giving such consent for valuable consideration mov-
ing from the street railroad company to such lot owner." 43
As to the nature of the otherwise legal power which the legislature
wished to place under a disability, the court said:
"The general assembly at an early day foresaw that the
public authorities, in the exercise of the power to grant fran-
chises for street railroads with a liability to make compensa-
tion only in cases of interference with the property rights
of ingress and egress, might act oppressively, or against the
wishes of the abutting lot owners, and therefore imposed a
further check upon that power, and required that the consent
in writing of the owners of a majority of the feet front on
the street should be obtained and produced to the proper
officer. This was done, as held by this court in Roberts v.
Easton, 19 Ohio St. 86, 'To protect owners of property on
the streets of cities . . . from the exercise of arbitrary
power on the part of the city authorities in permitting the
streets to be used for street railroads'." 44
Although the court held that the immunity of the abutting
owner had an exchange value and was very effective as a legal
instrument against the exercise of official power, yet it did not
hold that it was property. The court concluded that since it was
not property it could not be appropriated by eminent domain. The
language of the decision on this point reads as follows:
"But this additional check did not have the effect to
vest the fee of the street in the abutting lot owner, nor to give
him a right to compensation unless his easement of ingress
and egress should be injured. It therefore gave him no
more property rights than he had before the statute as to
such consents was enacted.
"Such consent is therefore not a property right adher-
ing to the lot, but is a personal right in the owner of the
43Ibid.
"Ibid. 192, 65 N. E. at 1014.
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lot, a power or sword in his hands with which to protect
his lot against the arbitrary powers of the city authorities. A
majority of the consents by the feet front is a condition prece-
dent to jurisdiction to pass a street railway ordinance, and
each abutting lot owner is free to aid in conferring such
jurisdiction, and free to withhold such aid. His actions
cannot be controlled in that regard by others on the street,
nor by courts of justice in their behalf. Such a condition,
such consent, in the nature of things cannot be appropri-
ated under the power of eminent domain." 4
The language of this part of the decision might be construed
as recognizing the abutting owner's immunity as property, but
not as property in the lot, and hence not subject to appropriation
by eminent domain power.4 "' However, in a subsequent decision, 40
the same interest was again construed by the same court, and was
held not to be property at all and therefore not entitled to the
protection of the "due process" clause of the Constitution. Some
years after the first decision the constitution of Ohio was amended
so as to permit the city of Cleveland to change its charter. One
of the changes in the charter did away with the necessity of se-
curing the abutting owners' consent in a situation such as that
presented by the Hamilton Traction Co.41 case. The property
owners contended that deprivation of their immunity was undue
process of law-first, because the immunity vested before the
charter was changed; secondly, because the general statute of
Ohio granting the immunity had never been repealed. The
injunction suit of the abutting owners reached the supreme court
of the state. After referring to the fact that it had previously
'Ibid. 192, 65 N. E. at 1014.
" It is recognized that some interests are considered property by the
courts for some purposes and not for others. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to
Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality (1926) 39
HARV. L. REv. 307. For example, in some jurisdictions "good will" has not been
recognized as property for purposes of considering compensation under the so-
called eminent domain clause of state constitutions. (Cal., Kan., Mass., N. Y.,
Penn., Tenn.) See 41 A. L. R. lO26 (1926). Yet, it is bought and sold, has
exchange value, and, independent of eminent domain consideration, it has been
held to have the property protection guarantee of the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution. See note 48 infra; Abbot v. Tacoma Bank, 175 U. S. 409,
20 Sup. Ct. 153 0899).
"Billings v. Cleveland Ry. 92 Ohio St. 478, 111 N. E. 155 (1915).
Supra note 42.
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held that the consent of release of such immunity was not prop-
erty under eminent domain consideration, the court said:
"Such consents are not property rights, but rights in
their nature personal to each owner of an abutting lot.
"Such personal rights were bestowed by the general as-
sembly on owners of abutting lots as a check upon the power
of the municipality. The right referred to not being a prop-
erty right (the taking of which would violate the guaranties
of the constitution, unless done by due process of law and
after full compensation), it follows that the statute confer-
ring it, being a matter of local concern, when inconsistent
with the provisions of the charter passed under favor of the
constitution, would fall simply because it was inconsis-
tent 48
Relation of the Intangible Interests to the Tangible Property
In the last two cases discussed the character of interest rep-
resented was held to be such as to resist the encroachment of emi-
nent domain power. In the mortgage lien case it was held that
mortgage liens were property but not the character of property
which could be reached by the process of eminent domain, because
the "superfluity of action" resulting would violate the same merry-
go-round principle which protects money and bills and notes from
seizure by eminent domain process.4 9 In the abutting owner's
immunity case it was held that such immunity was not an interest
of such character as could be judicially defined as property, and,
as eminent domain power could only reach property, it could not
" Billings v. Cleveland Ry., supra. note 46, at 491, 111 N. E. at 158. The
court in this case apparently was not in agreement with the views of Justice
Swayne of the Supreme Court of the United States that "Property is everything
which has an exchangeable value and the right of property includes the power to
dispose of it according to the will of the owner". This was in his dissenting
opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872), but it received
the approval of the majority of the court in Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minne-
sota, 134 U. S. 418, 10 Sup. Ct. 702 (1889). For legal foundations of the
exchange-value definition of property, see CommoNs, LEGAL FOU.NDAnONS OF
CAPITALISM (1924) C. 2.
One who follows the Hohfeldian analysis could probably see a good many
legal relations affected by allowing the power of the city council to break into
the immunity granted by statute to the abutting street owners. In the situation
he would very likely be able to see eminent domain exercising its usual process
in appropriating property either against the due process clause of the Constitution
or in accordance with it.
," Supra note 37.
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be condemned and taken. In each of these cases a further reason
was advanced for not allowing the interests to be paid for and
taken by eminent domain. This additional reason was based upon
the quantity of interest moved against, rather than the quality.
The court held in each case that the quantity of interest moved
against was not of sufficient depth to reach the corporeal or
physical thing affected or taken. It was therefore decided that
there was nothing on which eminent domain power could get a
foothold. Speaking of the immunity gained by withholding con-
sent, the court said in the abutting owner's immunity case:
"Such consent is therefore not a property right adher-
ing to the lot." 'o
In the mortgage lien case the court quoted with approval
from one of its preceding holdings:
"The mortgagee, however, had only a lien upon the
land out of which the right of way was taken. He was not
the owner of the same or of an interest therein." 51
In each instance it was decided that eminent domain could not
reach an interest which was held not to be deep enough to be an
interest in the physical property taken or affected. It has been held
that a legal interest may be deep enough to reach and enter the
physical property and therefore be an interest in the physical prop-
erty itself and at the same time not be of sufficient depth to afford
a foothold for the attachment of eminent domain. A decision so
holding is found in the case of Western and Atlantic Railroad Co.
' Supra note 48. Italics are the author's.
'Italics are tne author's. It is difficult to consider the statement frequently
made, that a mortgage lien is not an interest in the thing mortgaged because it is
a lien, as anything more than an historical legal assumption. This is especially
true after default in payment, since a mortgage lien carries with it the privilege
of entry and power of foreclosure and sale of the land itself with all the conse-
quent changes of legal relations which attend the exercise of such transactions.
See HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919) c. 2. However, the
view of the court in the above case is the orthodox view. I JONES. MORTGAGES
(8th ed. 1928) § 67. But see Ormsby v. Ottman, 85 Fed. 497 (1898). Inde-
pendently of the depth of the mortgagee's interest, it has been allowed to be
reached in a separate eminent domain proceeding, by statute in Wisconsin.
Aspinwall v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 41 Wis. 474 (1877). Some states, as a
matter of policy, have passed laws making the mortgagee a necessary party along
with the mortgagor in eminent domain proceedings. 2 L wis, EMINENT Do-
MAIN (3d ed. igog) § 523.
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v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,5 2 decided by the Supreme
Court of Georgia, in regard to what was designated by the court
as a "usufructuary interest in the land". In this case a railroad
company had leased a railroad from the state for twenty-nine
years, with a franchise to operate it. A telegraph company started
condemnation proceedings against the railroad company to con-
demn a right of way for its telegraph lines. The injunction suit
instituted by the railroad company against the prosecution of the
condemnation proceedings reached the supreme court of the state,
and, among other questions, it became necessary for the court to
decide whether the interest of the lessee railroad company was
such as to be subject to the power of eminent domain. The court
referred to a previous decision in which it had held that the same
railroad company's interest was a "usufructuary interest in the
land", because of certain "rights of forfeiture on broken condi-
tions subsequent", and other terms of the lease regarding the
state's reversionary interest.5
3
The court did not seem to adhere to the strict meaning of
the civil law, from which the term was borrowed, and recognized
that, as used in regard to the interest of the railroad company
as lessee, its "usufructuary interest" represented an "interest in
land". However, the court attempted to distinguish between an
"estate in land" and an "interest in land",M and held that such a
"usufructuary interest in the land" was not subject to the power
of eminent domain, and, as this represented the railroad com-
pany's interest, the telegraph company should move against the
railroad company's lessor, which was the state of Georgia. In
answer to the contention that the statute made this unnecessary,
the court, by Evans, J., said:
&2 138 Ga. 420, 75 S. E. 471 (1912).
"' State of Georgia v. W. & A. R. R., 136 Ga. 619, 71 S. E. 1055 (1911).
"Supra note 52, at 429, 75 S. E. at 475. The terms "estate in land" and
"interest in land" are usually synonymous. I BuRR, LAw DICTIONARy 434;
Freidman v. Macy, 17 Cal. 230 (1861). They are often used interchangeably.
Hurst v. Hurst, 7 W. Va. 289 (1874). "Estate when used in reference to land
signifies simply interest therein." City of N. Y. v. Stone, 20 Wend. 139, 142
(N. Y. 1838). See also Commonwealth's Appeal, 127 Pa. 435, 17 At. 1O94
(1889) ; Mulford v. Le Franc, 26 Cal. 88 (1864) ; Clift v. White, 12 N. Y. 5_27
(1855); James v. Morey, 2 Cow. 246 (N. Y. 1823); Minnesota Debenture Co.
v. Dean, 85 Minn. 473, 89 N. W. 898 (1902); New Orleans J. and G. N. R. R. v.
Hemphill, 35 Miss. 22 (1858).
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"Our attention is called to the provisions of the emi-
nent-domain law respecting the right of a telegraph company
to condemn the right of way of a railroad company, and espe-
cially to the provision that in such cases only the railroad
company is to be notified . . . For reasons already stated,
it is manifest that the statute does not contemplate proceed-
ings solely to condemn the right of way of a railroad com-
pany which has no ownership or easement of the right of
way or of the fee; one which is merely a tenant, possessing
no estate, but only a usufructuary interest in the land." 55
The telegraph company was permitted to amend its condem-
nation petition to make the state of Georgia a party, and, upon
condemnation proceedings being again resisted, the case reached
the supreme court of the state for the second time. 6 Evans, P. J.,
again referred to the usufructuary interest in the land of the rail-
road company and said:
"When the case was formerly before this court, one
of the points to be decided was whether the lessee had such
an interest in the railroad as would authorize, by condemna-
tion proceedings, the telegraph company to construct a line
of telegraph on the property of the State. This point was
decided adversely to the telegraph company. The decision
of the court went to the point that as the lessee's interest
was only to enter upon and enjoy the use of the property
leased, it had no estate or interest which was subject to the
exercise of the right of eminent domain." 5T
The outcome of the second case was a holding by the court that
since the usufructuary interest of the lessee was not a sufficient
interest in the physical property to be subject to the power of
eminent domain, and since the state of Georgia had not consented
that its interest in the property should be subject to eminent do-
main power, the proceedings failed and the telegraph company
could not thus acquire the right to run its lines on the railroad
right of way.5 8
'Western and Atlantic R. R. vs. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 52, at
430, 75 S. E. at 476.
142 Ga. 532, 83 S. E. 135 (1914).
Ibid. 533, 83 S. E. at 135.
'This case seems to have put the usufructuary interest in the same classifi-
cation as a mortgage lien in the sense that it is not subject at all to the power of
eminent domain. Property which is not subject at all to the power of eminent
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The property interests which may be reached in a suit to
quiet title or in an action for specific performance are not suscep-
tible of being subjected to the power of eminent domain for those
purposes, according to the decision of the Supreme Court of Kan-
"sas in Florence, etc., R. R. v. Lilley.59 A railroad company had ac-
quired land along its right of way for station grounds, depot, and
side track purposes, by purchase in fee. It occupied the land
either by itself or by tenant for eight years, when doubt arose as
to its documentary evidence of title being perfect. For this rea-
son, the railroad company instituted condemnation proceedings
under its power of eminent domain. The commissioners appointed
by the district court allowed the condemnation and awarded one
dollar in damages to the one to be compensated. This party being
unknown, the money was deposited with the county treasurer.
Sometime after the award was made, it was attacked by parties
who claimed to be owners in fee of the land and actually in pos-
domain should not be confused with property which cannot be reached standing
alone. In the sense that eminent domain proceedings cannot always condemn an
interest standing alone, even though it has power to take it, there are still deeper
interests than those which have been mentioned which it has been held cannot be
taken. This is due to the fact that the relationship between the interest moved
against and other interest or interests are so interdependent that the policy of the
law will not allow the condemnor to proceed against one of the property interests
standing alone in disregard of the other interests or relationships. In the first
hearing of Western and Atlantic Railroad Company v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., su~pra note 52, Evans, P. J., in the course of his decision gave it as
his opinion that if the railroad company were in the position of an ordinary
lessee and its possession were disturbed by eminent domain condemnation, it
would have to be separately compensated. But, said the court: "In this state a
tenant can neither assign his lease nor sublet the premises without the landlord's
permission. Nor can a tenant who leases premises for a particular use devote
them to other uses without the landlord's consent. Dodd v. Ozburn, 128 Ga.
380, 57 S. E. 701 (19o7). Acquisition of the right of occupancy of land by
means of condemnation is the equivalent of a conveyance. The difference con-
sists in the means of acquiring the right; the former is involuntary and the latter
is voluntary. If a tenant cannot convey the right to devote the premises to a use
not authorized by the lease, it must follow that the right cannot be acquired by
condemnation."
Many leases contain provisions against assignment, subleasing or changed
uses without consent by the landlord. In Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri
and Texas, assignment or subleasing by the lessee without the landlord's consent
is prohibited or restricted. JoNEs, LAIDLORD AND TFNANT (1go6) c. 6. In
Colorado a "married woman can do what she will with her own property, as any
other person sui juris, without reference to any restraint or disability of cover-
ture". However, the statute requires that condemnation proceedings must con-
sider the husband's relations and join him as a party defendant along with the
wife and that her individual property interest standing alone is not subject to the
power of eminent domain, even though she owns the absolute fee therein. Colo-
rado Central R. R. v. Allen, 13 Col. 22-9, 22 Pac. 6o5 (1889).
W 3 Kans. App. 588, 43 Pac. 857 (1896).
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session of the land at the time of the condemnation proceedings
and at the time of the appeal from the award. In their pleadings
they asserted that they had been occupying the land as lessees of
the railroad company under the mistaken belief that the railroad
company was the true owner. The railroad company, in answer,
contended that it owned the land by purchase, and that the con-
demnation proceedings and award confirmed its complete owner-
ship and title to the land, and that the status of the complainants
had been since their occupancy, and still was, that of lessees by
reason of a valid contract of lease entered into between them and
the railroad company. Upon the case reaching the Supreme Court
of Kansas, Dennison, J., in affirming that portion of the judg-
ment below, which held the railroad company's position not to be
tenable, said:
"To hold that a railroad company may ask the district
court to use this power to condemn land for its use, and to
have the value thereof and the damages awarded to the
owner, and then be permitted to show that it is already the
owner of said land, and entitled to the award, would be to
turn this proceeding into a farce, and subject the district
courts to ridicule. A condemnation proceeding under the
right of eminent domain can be legally maintained only to
subject the private property of one owner to the public use
of another, and to award the compensation therefor. It can-
not be instituted by a corporation to quiet its title to land it
claims to already own, nor can it be instituted for the purpose
of compelling a specific performance of a contract already
entered into between a corporation and others." 60
Property as Affected by Certain Trusts and Public Uses
The property considered thus far in this article has been held
to have had a repelling capacity to resist the encroachment of the
power of eminent domain, though the exercise of the power was
attempted for a public use or purpose. This was found to be on
account of its physical nature, or by reason of the character or
depth of the legal interest represented in the property moved
against. The use to which property has been put, or for which
it is held, especially if it be of a trust character, has found high
' Ibid. 590, 43 Pac. at 858.
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protection in other fields of the law. Though the protection is not
so high in the realm of eminent domain,61 it is not altogether
wanting. It is true that in certain situations property devoted to
one public use may be taken by the exercise of the power of emi-
nent domain and put to another public use. 62  It is also true that
eminent domain has been allowed to reach and take government-
owned property. 63 Yet it has been held that, when government-
owned property is devoted to the important use of aiding the
government in its necessary functions of fulfilling the high trust
imposed upon it of carrying out the purposes of its existence, such
property is protected from the thrust of eminent domain power. 64
The Federal Constitution authorizes Congress to acquire and hold
land for the erection of "forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards
and other needful buildings". 65 The term "needful buildings"
has been held to include armories, lighthouses, custom houses and
other property used to carry on the necessary activities of govern-
mental administration.66 As instruments for carrying on the
functions of general government, such property is not subject to
the power of eminent domain, or any other interference which
would prevent the carrying out of the purposes of government
"for the protection and interest of the states, their people and
property, as well as for the protection of the people generally of
the United States".
67
The rule is the same as to property held by the states of the
Union in a governmental capacity, and this rule protects such prop-
erty against condemnation by one who is acting under a general
or special power of eminent domain, and this has been held to
be so, even though the statute granting the power expressly pro-
vides for condemnation of state-owned property and includes in
"Trustees of Belfast Academy v. Salmond, ii Me. 109 (1833).
W2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATboNs (8th ed. 1927) 1113, n. 2;
ibid. 119o.
112o C. J. 6r9 (i92O).
See cases cited infra note 67.
ARTICLE i, § 8, CL 17.
See cases cited infra. note 67.
"U. S. v. Chicago, 7 How. 185 (U. S. 1849); U. S. v. Ames, Fed. Cas.
No. 14,441 (C. C. Mass. 1845); U. S. v. Railroad Bridge Co., Fed. Cas. No.
16,114 (C. C. N. D. Il. 1855) ; Barrett v. Palmer, 135 N. Y. 336, 31 N. E. 1017
(I892) ; Rockport, etc., Ry. v. State, 135 S. W. 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) ; Fort
Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, H4 U. S. 525, 5 Sup. Ct. 995 (1884).
20 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
its description the character of property which happens to be set
aside for such a use. Thus, in the state of Washington, in con-
struing an act which gave authority to condemn tide lands by
eminent domain power and provided that state-owned lands could
be taken, it was held by the supreme court that tide lands, which
the state had set aside for certain governmental purposes, could
not be reached by parties acting under authority of the act.
68
In construing the strength of the statute the court distin-
guished between land held by the state in its proprietary capacity
and land held by the state in its governmental capacity. In hand-
ing down the opinion of the Supreme Court, Fullerton, J., said:
"If, however, we have mistaken counsel's meaning, and
it be that they mean to assert that the statute is broad enough
to permit the condemnation for railway purposes of any prop-
erty of the state, other than the specifically exempted part,
we cannot agree with the contention. As is well known, the
state holds title to property in two entirely distinct capacities,
the one a proprietary capacity as individuals generally hold
property, and the other a governmental capacity; that is, in
trust for the public use. The rule therefore is that a statute
conferring upon the state or other municipal corporation the
general authority to sell, or a statute conferring the right to
condemn state or other municipal property generally, will, in
the absence of express words to the contrary, be confined to
such property as it holds in its proprietary character." 69
As to what the consequences would be if the rule were other-
wise, Justice Fullerton observed:
"Indeed, if this be not the rule, the Legislature has by
the act in question granted to railway companies power to
condemn any of the state lands for railway purposes (save
that, of course, which is specially exempted), which would
include the lands on which its capital buildings are sit-
uated." 70
What is a government activity is sometimes hard to deter-
mine in other fields of law, but in the field of eminent domain, in
the sense of resisting condemnation, it seems to refer to what-
' State v. Jefferson County Super. Ct., 91 Wash. 454, 157 Pac. 1097 (1916).
0Ibid., 157 Pac. at lO98.
'"Ibid., 157 Pac. at O99.
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ever undertaking the state or municipal subdivision conducts as
such and has been held to include property used for varied activi-
ties,71 varying from a railroad for profit 72 to an asylum for char-
ity.
73
In most of these cases the court has taken pains to point out,
as did Fullerton, J., in the tide land case, the sharp distinction be-
tween property held in trust by a government for the fulfillment
of governmental purposes and property merely owned by a gov-
ernment in its proprietary capacity and not subject to such a trust.
That land held in a proprietary capacity by the federal government
for settlement or sale was not affected by such a trust has long
been the opinion of the legal fraternity. It has also been thought
that such land located within the boundaries of a state was like
that of any individual proprietor and could be taken by eminent
domain power granted by the state, without the need of any per-
mission or act of Congress. These conclusions have found sup-
port in the actual practice of thus appropriating such lands.7
4
They have found their way into legal text books " and have ap-
peared in judicial opinions. 76  The first case in which the subject
was given special attention and was definitely discussed by a fed-
eral court was the case of U. S. v. Railroad Bridge Company,
7
7
decided in 1845, when railroad building in the west began to at-
tract settlers. The decision was against the granting of an in-
junction to prevent a railroad company, with power of eminent
domain from North Dakota, from locating its road over a por-
Op. cit. supra note 63, at 61g.
'Atlanta v. Central R. R., 53 Ga. i2o (1873).
'Matter of Rosenbank Ave., 162 App. Div. 638, 147 N. Y. Supp. 638
(1914); St. Louis, etc., R. R. v. Ill. Trust for Education of Blind, 43 III. 3o3
(1867); Rockport R. R. v. State, supra note 67.
U. S. v. Railroad Bridge Co., supra note 67.
2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. igog) § 414.
'Texas, etc., Ry. v. Kirk, 115 U. S. I, 5 Sup. Ct. 1113 (1885); Fort
Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, supra note 67; U. S. v. Chicago, 7 How. 185 (U. S.
1848; Union Pac. Ry. v. Leavenworth, etc., R. R., 29 Fed. 728 (C. C.
Kan. 1887); Illinois Central R. R. v. Chicago, etc., R. R., 26 Fed. 477 (C. C.
N. D. Ill. 1886) ; Northern Pac. R. R. v. St. Paul, etc., R. R., 3 Fed. 702 (C. C.
-Minn. i88o); Union Pac. Ry. v. Burlington, etc., R. R., 3 Fed. io6 (C. C. D.
Neb. i88o); U. S. v. Ames, supra note 67; U. S. v. Railroad Bridge Co., supra
note 67; People v. District Court, ii Colo. 147, 17 Pac. 298 (1887) ; Flint, etc.,
R. R. v. Gordon, 41 Mich. 420, 2 N. W. 648 (1879); Rockport, etc., R. R. v.
State, supra note 67.
W Supra note 67.
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tion of a federal military reservation in North Dakota, no longer
used for military purposes. After stating that the immunity of
such lands had not been previously raised and judicially decided,
the court went into a lengthy discussion concerning land held in
proprietary ownership by the federal government, and, in its clos-
ing paragraph on the subject, said:
"No one can question the right of the Federal govern-
ment to select the sites for its forts, arsenals and other pub-
lic buildings. The right claimed for the state has no refer-
ence to lands specially appropriated, but to those held as gen-
eral proprietor by the government, whether surveyed or not.
The right of eminent domain appertains to a state sover-
eignty, and is exercised free from the restraints of the fed-
eral constitution. The property of individuals is subject to
this right, and no reason is perceived why the aggregate prop-
erty, in a state, of the individuals of the Union, should not
also be subject to it. The principle is the same, and the
beneficial result to the proprietors is the same, in proportion
to their interests." 78
The case was reported by the Honorable John McLean, Circuit
Justice, and syllabus 4 and syllabus 5 of his report of the case
speak of the practice as follows:
"In all the Western states, within which there have
been public lands, it has been the uniform practice to make
public roads through the lands of the United States. This
every state may do, under its power of eminent domain .
"And this power is exercised by a state, subject to no
power vested in the federal government. The proprietary
right of the United States can in no respect restrict or mod-
ify this exercise of the sovereign power by a state." 79
Four years afterwards, it became necessary for the Supreme
Court of the United States to pass upon the power of Chicago
to authorize the opening of streets through the lands and prop-
erty of the United States known as "Fort Dearborn" which the
Secretary of War had authorized to be plotted for sale but which
had not yet been sold.80 Mr. Justice Woodbury delivered the
"'Ibid. 693.
7Ibid. 686.
' U. S. v. Chicago, 7 How. 185 (U. S. 1849).
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opinion of the court in a decision which went against the city of
Chicago, apparently because the authority of the Secretary of
War had not been exercised to the point of sale or release for
sale and because there was no provision made by Chicago for com-
pensation. In the course of his opinion, Mr. Justice Woodbury
contrasted land of the federal government devoted to important
governmental functions and land held by it in an ordinary pro-
prietary capacity, and said:
"It is not questioned that the land within a state pur-
chased by the United States as a mere proprietor and not
reserved or appropriated to any special purpose may be liable
to condemnation for street or highways, like the land of
other proprietors." 81
Similar judicial expressions continue in the decisions of cases,
both federal and state, of later date.
2
The validity of the proposition that so-called proprietary
lands of the federal government, located within the borders of
states, were not protected by any trust, policy or laws against the
exercise of state-granted power of eminent domain was challenged
in the federal courts for the first time in 1915, in the Utah Power
and Light Company cases, 83 seventy years after the U. S. v. Rail-
road Bridge case was decided. The Utah Power and Light Com-
pany had located its reservoir, flume, conduit and other equipment
on vacant, unoccupied land open for settlement and sale and not
appropriated or used by the federal government in the carrying
on of any governmental activities. The United States govern-
ment, through the office of its Attorney General, filed suits in the
Federal District Court of Utah to enjoin the continued occupancy
of the land. In addition to contending that its occupancy be per-
mitted under certain acts of Congress, the company contended
that its power of eminent domain, granted it by the state of Utah,
enabled it to appropriate the unoccupied and unused land of the
federal government. Upon the Utah Power and Light Company
cases reaching the Circuit Court of Appeals, District Judge Van
"Ibid. I94.
's Supra note 76.
'Utah Power & Light Co. v. U. S., 23o Fed. 328 (C. C. A. 8th i915).
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Valkenburg, who rendered the decision for the court, took up the
cases we have referred to in the text and notes of this article, and,
after adverting to the peculiar facts with which they dealt, the
application of the expressions to the cases in hand, and the modi-
fications implied in cases as they approached the present epoch, held
against the company, both on jurisdictional grounds 84 and on
grounds which he based upon the trust nature of the property
itself. On this latter ground he was able to find a sufficient trust
imposed upon the property to enable it to resist the power of emi-
nent domain, though the property was not being used in any gov-
ernmental activities. On this point he said:
"The public lands of the United States are held by it,
not as an ordinary individual proprietor, but in trust for all
the people of all the states to pay debts and provide for the
common defense and general welfare under the express terms
of the Constitution itself. It matters not whether the title
is acquired by cession from other states, or by treaty with a
foreign country, whether the lands are located within states
or in territories, they are held for these supreme public uses
when and as they arise." 85
The Utah Power and Light Company cases were carried to the
United States Supreme Court where they were combined with
other cases of the same nature and decided in one opinion.8 6
Briefs were filed, in support of the power of eminent domain
granted by a state of the Union to reach idle lands of the federal
government, by the attorney generals of the states of Utah, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Nevada and Nebraska, through special counsel as
anici curice. However, the decision of District Judge Van Valk-
enburg remained unshaken and was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court, except that part which did not require payment
for what was held to be unauthorized occupancy of the lands in
question.
s The jurisdictional grounds will be discussed in Part II of this article.
The jurisdictional prohibition does not work both ways. For the reasoning
which supports the validity of appropriation of state-owned proprietary lands by
the exercise of eminent domain under authority of the federal government, on
grounds of constitutional power, see Stockton v. Baltimore, etc., R. R., 32 Fed.
9 (C. C. N. J. 1887).
'Supra note 83, at 336. Italics are the author's.
so243 U. S. 389, 37 Sup. Ct. 387 (i916).
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The trust theory of the states, which allow their proprietary
land to be reached, and that of the federal government, which at
the present time does not, present a difference of construction on
what constitutes a public trust which is complete enough to ex-
clude the power of eminent domain. An examination of the line
of cases to which reference has been made shows that the state
courts hold that such a trust covers only present uses of land in
governmental activities, and that up to 1915 the decisions of the
federal courts revealed the same opinion. However, the present
federal holding is that such a trust covers future uses, when and
as they arise. The state courts hold that the use must be present,
definite, actual and active, or a part of a definite plan which is
shortly to be put into execution. The federal holding refers to
the long run or indefinite future and to undefined purposes not
yet planned. These broad future purposes are "to pay debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare".
8 7
The position of the federal courts in the Utah Power and
Light Company cases is that the state courts' present use inter-
pretation of what constitutes a public trust which will exclude
the invasion of eminent domain power cannot be applied to land
owned by the federal government, lying within the boundaries of
states, because the federal courts, regardless of what they appear
to have done in the past, will not accept that interpretation, and
also because of the jurisdictional reasons not here discussed.s s
Consistent with this view, the decisions in the Utah Power and
Light Company cases held, on the same ground of a trust for the
future, that the same kind of unused or idle land owned by the
federal government, not located within the borders of states, is
likewise not subject to the power of eminent domain. The total
effect of the Utah Power and Light Company cases has been
to withdraw from the appropriating power of eminent domain all
' Idle lands of the state held, like the unoccupied lands of the federal gov-
ernment, for "settlement and sale", could with equal reason be said to be held in
trust "to pay debts and provide for the common defense. and general welfare" of
the people. The fact that states have granted general authority for state lands
to be taken by the power of eminent domain and courts have allowed the power
to reach all such idle lands, shows the view of the public policy of these states to
be that the exercise of the power of eminent domain over lands not in actual use
in governmental activities is a fulfillment of such a trust and not a violation of it.
' Supra note 84.
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idle land of the United States held for settlement or sale or other-
wise not in use for governmental activities, except that land spe-
cifically designated by Congress for release."s
The portion of Judge Van Valkenburg's decision in the Utah
Power and Light Company cases, dealing with a trust for future
use, seems recently to have found reflection and reassertion in
President Hoover's inaugural address. This decision, along with
later decisions sustaining withdrawals by the federal government
of unused lands "from settlement, entry or other form of appro-
priation" 90 is, no doubt, but a part of the record of a public
policy of conservation which is a change from the policy which
prevailed in the earlier days when the west was being first set-
tled and industrial adventure was allowed freer play on the public
domain. It is evident that the decision does not mean that idle,
unoccupied or unused lands of the federal government are per-
manently withdrawn from appropriation by eminent domain, but
that such lands will be released from time to time for such appro-
priation, as the merits and needs of the situation recommend them-
selves to Congress and its recognized agencies. Exercise of the
power of eminent domain on these lands will depend on the will
of the federal government and not on the will of the appropriator.
(Author's Note: Other trusts and uses and the resistant ca-
pacity which they have been held, under certain conditions, to
give property against the encroachment of eminent domain power
will be taken up in a subsequent article and will close the discussion
so far as it relates to Part I, or "The Property." Part II, which
deals with "The Power", will follow.)
'o The enactment of legislation by Congress, opening up such land to appro-
priation by the exercise of eminent domain power, is a political declaration that
the exercise of eminent domain power over such land is not an interference with
the trust imposed on such land "to pay debts and provide for the common defense
and general -welfare", and the courts cannot go behind such congressional deci-
sion, U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. i
[U. S. 1849). The remedy for those who are opposed to the effects of the Utah
Power and Light Company cases would seem to be in the hands of Congress
rather than of the courts.
'Mason, et al. v. U. S., 26o U. S. 545, 43 Sup. Ct. 20o (1928) ; U. S. v.
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 35 Sup. Ct. 309 (194).
